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INDONESIA IN 1984 
Pancasila, Politics, and Power 
Donald E. Weatherbee 
The night of September 12, 1984, sawJakarta's worst 
street violence since the anti-Tanaka, anti-cukong Malari affair of a decade 
ago. Hundreds of Moslem youths fired up by inflammatory mosque 
lectures moved through the streets of Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta) in 
bloodly confrontation with the security forces. Yelling antigovernment 
and anti-Chinese slogans and epithets, they charged Indonesian army 
units and were dispersed by gunfire, forced to give way in a rampaging 
retreat. As many as 28 people were killed. The government quickly 
rounded up the suspected ringleaders and radical Islamic teachers. While 
clamping down on the political content of the da'wah (Islamic instruction 
and missionary information activity), the security elite quickly sought to 
shift the blame for the Tanjung Priok incident to underground com- 
munist elements. Even so, Jakarta and other centers in East and Central 
Java were flooded with underground pamphlets inciting the faithful to 
take up arms to defend their religion against those who would destroy 
Islam. A series of bomb blasts and incendiary fires, together with numer- 
ous bomb and arson threats, frayed already tense nerves. 
The pattern of terrorist events suggested to some a spreading threat 
of embryonic urban guerrilla warfare.' Senior officers of the Indone- 
sian Armed Forces (ABRI), including the ABRI commander, General 
L. B. Moerdani, visited leading mosques and pesantran (traditional Islamic 
schools) to tell the ulama and kiyayi that ABRI was not the enemy of 
Islam. "I would like to assert," Gen. Moerdani told an East Javanese 
audience of about a thousand Islamic teachers, "that Moslems in In- 
donesia are not cornered and will never be cornered."2 But cornered is 
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exactly how many of the santri-the strictly committed Moslems-feel 
since they see aggressive propagation of the state ideology of Pancasila as 
undermining the role of religion. 
The Pancasila State 
The Indonesian state is based on five fundamental principles (Pancasila): 
belief in one god, humanitarianism, national unity, consensual democ- 
racy, and social justice. First enunciated by Sukarno in June 1945 as the 
value foundation of an independent state, in the New Order regime of 
President Suharto the Pancasila has been ideologically specified and 
operationalized to provide guidance for all relationships in every social 
domain. Rather than the universal values embodied in the original for- 
mulations (later narrowed by Sukarno himself), Pancasila today is inter- 
preted as embodying traditional indigenous (idealized) values of social 
harmony and absence of political conflict, providing culturally neutral 
guidelines for behavior in a plural society where "development" tends to 
be measured by aggregate indicators of economic growth. Furthermore, 
by making Pancasila the official ideology of all Indonesians, Islam be- 
comes but one of five tolerated religious streams with no legitimate claim 
to exclusivity. 
In 1978 the government embarked on an intensive program of 
ideological training and upgrading through courses of study known by 
the contraction of the full Indonesian name as P4 courses.3 By law 
(II/MPR11978) all Indonesian citizens are to go through the P4 course. 
The first targets of Pancasila "upgrading" were bureaucrats, and the 
courses have now replaced the traditional "hazing" period in the univer- 
sities and will be in place in the junior and senior high schools in the 
1985/1986 academic year. In the lower schools Pancasila Moral Educa- 
tion (PMP) has become part of the standard curriculum. By cabinet 
decision in October 1984, it was decided to proceed with the Pancasila 
upgrading of ulamas, Christian priests and pastors, and Balinese religious 
men. Other, voluntary, social groups have followed suit. Even the pros- 
titutes of Samarinda (East Kalimantan) have undergone P4 training "to 
increase their devotion and service to the community and the nation."4 
For the government, the internalization of Pancasila values is the 
necessary mental and spiritual prerequisite for citizens to discharge their 
duties in the state. For critics of the regime, however, it is an effort to 
3. Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila. The content of the P4 course is 
analyzed in Michael Morfit, "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the 
New Order Government," Asian Survey, 21:8 (August 1981), pp. 838-851. 
4. Jakarta Post, October 1, 1984. 
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buttress authority: for "liberals," a conservative defense of the social and 
political status quo; for increasing numbers of Moslems, a denial of the 
proper role of the religion of, statistically at least, 90% of the population. 
Moslems place the campaign in the context of other government policies 
that were deemed anti-Islam: the abortive 1973 marriage bill, the strug- 
gle over the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the recognition of kebatinan 
(Javanese mysticism) as a religion, questions on the place of religious 
holidays in the academic calendar, etc., all part of a suspected official 
policy of secularization to deny a special place for Islam. To santri 
concerns about the political dominance of the syncretic Javanese are 
added more acute suspicions about Christian missionary designs on the 
faithful as well as insidious Chinese influence. 
The Politics of Pancasila and Polarization 
To oppose the social and political impact of the Pancasila state is to 
become identified with the twin bugaboos of "extremism of the left" 
(communism) and "extremism of the right" (radical Islam), and in the 
government's mind the two are linked. The threat and occurrence of 
Moslem political violence has always been present and manifest. At its 
inception the republic was attacked by forces of Islamic orthodoxy 
wishing to create a theocratic state resting on Qu'ranic law rather than 
religious pluralism and tolerance. Historically, however, most Moslems 
have tried to advance their interests through legal political competition. 
The forced alliance of the four Moslem political parties under the United 
Development Party (PPP) umbrella disciplined Islamic electoral politics 
in the New Order framework. Nevertheless, the PPP-campaigning 
with the ka'abah as its symbol-did provide a focal point for Moslem 
political opposition to the government. However, in 1983 the decision 
was made that all political parties had to adopt Pancasila as their sole 
ideological principle, and in August 1984, after much protestation, a 
government stage-managed PPP congress fell into line. Islam as such is 
no longer openly the ideological foundation of the PPP. Even the use of 
its traditional symbol is in doubt. The Nahadatul Ulama party, the most 
resistant of the PPP's constituent members, was expected to follow suit 
by adopting Pancasila as its sole principle at its December congress. 
For the santri community one of the lessons of the Dutch colonial 
experience that has contemporary relevance is that Moslems through 
their "socio-cultural" consciousness and activities cannot be separated 
from politics.5 For this reason the greatest political focus in 1984 was on 
5. Ahmad Syafi Maarif, "Islam in Indonesia: Cultural Opportunity?" Mizan, 1:1 
(January 1984), pp. 6-7. 
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the draft bill on mass organizations, one of five draft bills designed to 
centralize the institutionalization of Pancasila authority in Indonesian 
life. The draft bill on mass organizations would compel all social organi- 
zations, including voluntary organizations organized on the basis of re- 
ligious profession, to accept the Pancasila as their sole ideological princi- 
ple. The law as drafted gives the government broad interventionary 
powers and even the right to suspend or dissolve voluntary social organi- 
zations if they are not contributing to the development of a Pancasila 
society. Although government spokesmen repeatedly assured that the 
bill was not aimed at Islam, it was seen as a major attack on any legitimate 
Islamic voice in critical matters of human affairs other than the narrowly 
religious business of the mosque andfiqih (Islamic law). 
Although the government's GOLKAR faction together with the mili- 
tary appointees have an automatic controlling majority in the parliament, 
it appears that the negative reaction to the social organization bill in 
Islamic circles has given some pause. Open hearings on the draft bills 
were held by the various parliamentary factions. Before the October 
recess a special parliamentary committee was formed to study the bills 
further with a view toward finding some compromise. The problem is, 
compromise with which Islamic groups? Islam in Indonesia does not 
speak with a single authoritative voice. The establishment Islamic in- 
stitutions, and especially the political parties, are domesticated in the 
New Order framework. The protest comes from nonestablishment, 
more radical elements who are perhaps touched by foreign influences. 
Growing numbers of the disaffected are convinced that the regime is 
fundamentally hostile to Islam and that the champions of religion must 
be found outside of legal politics and with those who would wave the 
banner of jihad. The year 1984 then saw acceleration of the development 
of a religious militancy which, in Ruth McVey's words, "radically chal- 
lenges the socioeconomic and cultural assumptions of the established 
Indonesian order and appears as the spokesman for the common man 
against an exploiting elite."6 
The Political Economy 
A different dimension is given the Tanjung Priok affair when it is placed 
in the context of the accumulation of social and economic problems 
made even more intense in the urban slums of Jakarta or the other 
Indonesian cities of a million or more. Gen. Moerdani recognized that 
6. Ruth McVey, "Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics," in James P. 
Piscatori, ed., Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), p. 218. 
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the sources of unrest mobilizing antigovernment elements were more 
than just religious when he quipped that the instigators of agitation will 
say that "only the military and the Chinese enjoy the good life in this 
country."7 The uttering of such sentiments, albeit couched in more 
sophisticated terms, caused some publications to lose their licenses in 
1984. Expo was banned in January for an article on the alleged govern- 
ment connections of Chinese billionaires. Topik was suspended in Feb- 
ruary for two articles tending to arouse class hatred among the poor. 
Fokus was banned in May for printing an article on wealth in Indonesia 
considered likely to create "negative social effects." However, as the 
editorialist of the Catholic daily Kompas pointed out after the Fokus ban, 
"The problem of the economically strong and the economically weak, of 
those who are already enjoying the fruits of development and those who 
are still deprived of them is still with us."8 
If the New Order's formula for success is "organizational 
superiority + economic growth = regime survival,"9 i.e., legitimacy de- 
pends upon economic performance, then worrisome signs are on the 
horizon even though outwardly the macro economy looks healthy. In 
April Indonesia's fourth five-year development plan (REPELITA IV) was 
inaugurated. It began with a FY 1985 "austerity" budget. The need to 
accommodate to the "post-oil era" led to slashes in subsidies for con- 
sumer essentials such as rice, sugar, and domestic fuel. It was the re- 
gime's ability to make politically tough but economically rational deci- 
sions and enforce them that helped Indonesia successfully weather the 
impact of the global recession. 
The World Bank's 1984 review of the economy found the Indonesian 
upturn much stronger than predicted and accepted as realistic the 5% 
annual growth target of REPELITA IV. Through the year the indicators 
continued to be encouraging, even as the international oil market 
slumped. The trade and payment figures seemed favorable. Inflation 
appeared to be under control. Yet there were disturbing anomalies, not 
the least the precipitous drop in domestic and foreign private invest- 
ment, perhaps to only a quarter of what it was in 1983. A number of 
factors have been advanced to explain this: uncertainties about the im- 
pact of the new tax policies, confusion over the debate on the anti- 
monopoly bill, a wait-and-see attitude toward the government's plans to 
privatize inefficient and price-controlled state enterprises, regulatory and 
7. Jakarta Post, October 4, 1984. 
8. Kompas, May 28, 1984. 
9. Donald K. Emmerson, "Regime Survival in Indonesia: Questions for an Old Order," 
conference paper, August 1983. 
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administrative bureaucracy, fear of economic nationalism engendered by 
the counter-purchase policy, etc. Whatever the reason, investment slug- 
gishness has raised questions about achievement of the 21.4% annual 
increase in private investment built into REPELITA IV. To stimulate 
investment, the government tried to create a more favorable climate for 
nonindigenous (Chinese) investment in productive activity. In a widely 
reported and commented upon address to the Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in March, Gen. Moerdani called for abandon- 
ment of the pribumi (ethnic Indonesian)/non-pribumi distinctions in 
economic matters. Some backlash to the effort to facilitate greater 
Chinese involvement in economic development can be discerned in the 
aftermath of the Tanjung Priok affair. The first bombings were of the 
Bank Central Asia, part of the holdings of Liem Sioe Liong whose link to 
President Suharto has come under bitter attack from regime opponents. 
Questions must now be raised about the effect that the drive for domes- 
tic capital will have on the delicate racial issue. 
Investment Strategy 
A significant issue in the investment strategy of REPELITA IV is the 
proper mix between labor intensive and capital intensive industries as 
well as the appropriate technology/high technology dichotomy. The 
pressing social need that directly relates to regime stability continues to 
be job creation, and it is independently expected that the employment 
situation by the end of REPELITA IV will worsen as the labor force 
population grows. Conservatively we might expect the unemployment 
rate to rise from the World Bank figure of 4. 1% in 1980 to nearly 9%, or 
in absolute numbers, an increase from nearly 3 million to 10 million 
unemployed. To this we must add the nearly 30% of the population that 
is significantly underemployed. 
The ability of the agricultural sector to absorb employment is rapidly 
declining. One would expect an industrialization strategy that would 
emphasize labor intensive, small-scale industries with a high domestic 
content. Although the five-year plan attaches priority to job creation and 
small-scale industry (critics would call it only lip service), in fact it is still 
programmatically skewed to large-scale capital intensive activity with 
high import content such as the internationally uncompetitive and al- 
ready technologically obsolescent Cilegon cold rolling steel mill (another 
undertaking of the Liem group together with state-owned Krakateau 
Steel). Furthermore, the centerpiece of Indonesia's industrialization 
strategy is the development of a high technology complex focused on 
dual capable military/civilian products of which the PT Nurtanio aircraft 
enterprise is the most highly visible. Although backed by powerful 
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political and bureaucratic interests, the spillover of this strategy in terms 
of jobs and technology transfer to small industry is arguable.'0 
President Suharto has vigorously denied as groundless and misleading 
charges that the economic development program benefited only a 
minority of the population and was widening the rich-poor gap. He 
places the program in the longer path of development on which In- 
donesia has been progressing since the first REPELITA in 1969. Social 
equity will emerge in this sequence in the sixth REPELITA (1994- 
1999). The question is whether or not pent up social and economic 
demands, possibly linked to revolutionary Islam, can be contained until 
REPELITA VI without much greater coercion. 
Foreign Policy 
"Our voice should be heard. After all, we are a nation of 160 million 
people!" 
This statement is the bottom line justification for a new national 
assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy. After years of carefully pro- 
jecting a nonthreatening, cooperative low profile in the region and 
beyond, Jakarta now is beginning to claim a role more consonant with its 
deeply felt need for leadership. In the words of former U.S. Ambassador 
to Indonesia David Newsom, it is a nation "which is reaffirming its 
position in the world and the historical view of its nationalism."" That 
view is based not only on the political arithmetic of population but also 
on national perceptions of geostrategic importance, natural resources, 
"golden age" myths of Majapahit, and an implicit demand for respectful 
recognition on the international scene of the accomplishments of 
Suharto's New Order regime. The desire to play a role more commensu- 
rate with Indonesia's size, power, and interests was made official in the 
presidential tasking of the Fourth Development Cabinet announced in 
March 1983. The fourth item in the five point program (Panca Krida) 
called for the "intensification of Indonesia's independent and active 
foreign policy." 
A significant theme in the Indonesian message is that Indonesia is 
going to participate-struggle if necessary-in determining the regional 
political map. This is viewed as a natural policy demand of a major 
regional power, one that says it has a legitimate interest in the alterations 
of the regional status quo and the settlement of regional problems. Its 
10. See, for example, Hal Hill, "High Time for Hi-Tech--or Is It," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, July 12, 1984. 
11. See, for example, "Letter from Indonesia," Christian Science Monitor, March 30, 
1984. 
194 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXV, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 1985 
contemporary relevance, of course, has to do with the Kampuchean crisis 
in which Indonesia no longer is content to simply follow the lead of 
ASEAN's frontline state. The more than five years of confrontation with 
Vietnam have in Jakarta's view made the region vulnerable to Chinese 
political and strategic designs, further isolated and weakened Vietnam as 
a potential buffer to China, and impeded the development of self-reliant, 
nonaligned regionalism. 
DUAL TRACK DIPLOMACY 
Fearing that simply tailing after Thailand (and by extension the PRC) will 
only lead farther down the road of a bleeding diplomatic stalemate, 
Indonesia in 1984 aggressively pursued a "dual track" diplomacy, seeking 
through a bilateral dialogue with Vietnam a more "realistic" approach to 
compromise over Kampuchea than that necessarily consensually 
sanctioned in ASEAN's diplomacy. The most dramatic foreign policy 
event of the year was General Moerdani's official visit to Hanoi in 
February. This was the first visit of a senior ASEAN official to Vietnam 
since 1980 and was made apparently without prior ASEAN consultation 
or preconditions. Moerdani's remarks downgrading any Vietnamese 
threat to Southeast Asia and accepting the existence of a China threat to 
Vietnam reflect Indonesian military frustration with the bargaining 
mentality of the frontline states. In the same month a delegation from 
Jakarta's influential Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
traveled to Hanoi to take part in an Indonesian-Vietnam seminar on 
problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach failed to follow up on 
any possible openings when he visited Jakarta in March, in fact embar- 
rassing his hosts by his intransigence. With the opening of Vietnam's 
delayed "dry season" offensive and cross border incursions into Thailand 
in operations against Khmer resistance camps, Indonesia "put to rest for 
awhile" its efforts at dialogue with Hanoi, joining its ASEAN colleagues 
in May and again in July in tough hard-line restatements of the ASEAN 
conditions. The rent in the fabric of ASEAN solidarity seemed mended. 
Almost immediately, however, Indonesians again had second thoughts 
about the lack of flexibility on the Thai cum Chinese side, privately 
worrying that the midsummer ASEAN rhetoric had been too harsh. 
Indonesia has been designated by ASEAN as its official interlocutor with 
Hanoi in an effort to make the dual tracks at least run parallel. Foreign 
Minister Mochtar resumed the "dialogue" with the Vietnamese in New 
York during the U.N. General Assembly session. A planned January 
1985 official visit by Mochtar to Hanoi will no doubt continue it. It is 
difficult to imagine, however, any substantive breakthrough in the im- 
mediate future. 
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LOOK EAST (BLOC) 
Foreign Minister Mochtar has likened dealing with the United States and 
the USSR to navigating between two coral reefs. A second characteristic 
marking Indonesia's 1984 foreign policy profile was a rhetorical moving 
back to a more equidistant position between the superpowers. This was 
accompanied by a campaign to expand commercial opportunities with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
The highlight of the year was Mochtar's visit in April to Moscow, the 
highest ranking visit by an Indonesian in a decade. Although no progress 
was made with respect to Kampuchea, the visit was successful in setting 
the tone for closer economic ties, an Indonesian goal that was em- 
phasized by President Suharto in accepting the credentials of the new 
Soviet Ambassador to Indonesia in May. The concentrated effort in 1984 
to expand economic contacts with the Soviet Union and other Eastern 
European countries is part of the general Indonesian attempt to boost 
non-oil exports. A large delegation from the Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry toured the Soviet Union in June. They returned 
prudently optimistic about the prospects laid out to them by their Soviet 
hosts. In October, Coordinating Minister for Economy and Finance Ali 
Wardhana led a government delegation to the Soviet Union, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Meanwhile, many of the regulatory 
restrictions that had been in place since 1967 constraining direct trade 
and shipping contacts with communist countries were lifted during the 
year. 
It was not purely economic interest that justified the openings to the 
East. Indonesian analysts placed the policy squarely in the framework of 
equidistance between the two superpowers in a region where, from the 
Indonesian point of view, the long-term threat is from China, and a 
signal, perhaps, to the United States that Indonesia has other options if 
the U.S. should place a higher value on its China connection than on 
ASEAN. President Suharto accepted an invitation for a state visit to the 
USSR. The outlines of a substantially more "nonaligned" foreign policy 
were discernible in 1984, but they still do not contain "normalization" of 
diplomatic relations with the Pebple's Republic of China. On the other 
hand, there now appears to be an elite civilian/military consensus 
emerging favoring the opening of direct trade relations with the PRC. 
CLOSE NEIGHBORS 
Indonesia-Papua New Guinea relations were seriously impaired during 
the year as Indonesian military activities along their common border and 
the presence of perhaps 9,000 Irian Jaya "refugees" or illegal border 
crossers led to bitter and sometimes undiplomatic verbal exchanges 
between the two countries. These moved from technical issues of prior 
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communication on border exercises and the administration of repatria- 
tion to broader issues of Indonesian cultural policy in Irian Jaya and 
PNG sympathy for Melanesian separatism. Jakarta was particularly cha- 
grined by the PNG attack in the U.N. General Assembly in October, 
echoed by Vanuatu. The breakdown in the relationship comes inoppor- 
tunely for Jakarta since another aspect of its new policy emphasis has 
been on developing closer relations with the nations of the South Pacific, 
both bilaterally and through ASEAN. This is part of the "human re- 
sources development" program being formulated by Indonesia following 
the June 1984 ASEAN decision to be more Pacific-conscious. 
The irritated PNG border area also contributed to a further lowering 
of the temperature in an already cool Indonesian-Australian relationship. 
Although Canberra assiduously tried to avoid any hint of involvement or 
interference, the dispute itself tended to confirm suspicions harbored by 
many Australians, particularly in the ruling Australian Labour Party, 
about Indonesia's long-range objectives. This, of course, was linked 
publicly to the East Timor issue, which still arouses passion. That the 
problem in the relationship is not simply one of atmospherics, style, or 
the causes of the "left" was clearly demonstrated in March 1984 by the 
leaking of an Australian secret, cabinet-endorsed defense document that 
considered the possible, but in the near term unlikely, use of force by 
Indonesia against Australia in various scenarios including political insta- 
bility in Indonesia itself. 
Although East Timor for some external observers in Australia and 
elsewhere might still be the referent for evidence of Indonesian expan- 
sionism, security forces in mid-1984 claimed that Fretilin's organized 
resistance finally had been crushed, this after a renewed military cam- 
paign following the collapse of earlier policies of peaceful reconciliation. 
At the United Nations, one of the few remaining venues for effective 
Fretilin diplomacy, the General Assembly for the second year in a row 
postponed debate on the question. 
Conclusion 
Jusuf Wanandi of Jakarta's CSIS, an intellectual unit spurring the new 
higher international profile, has been quoted as saying, "The world's 
going to be hearing a lot more from Indonesia now."'2 Its voice has been 
quiet but increasingly firm. In viewing Indonesia's international position, 
three factors have been identified as contributing to its contemporary 
constructive regional role: internal political stability, economic growth, 
12. As quoted by Joseph P. Manguno, "Voice of Moderation: Indonesia Intends to Play 
a More Assertive Role in World Politics," Asian Wall StreetJournal Weekly, March 12, 1984. 
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and foreign policy consistency.'3 The last, foreign policy consistency, 
which is further described as conciliatory, amicable, and flexible, is in 
large measure dependent on the first two, essentially domestic condi- 
tions. Although there is no empirical basis for expecting domestic break- 
down and upheaval, we are not so far removed historically from the 
stridency of Indonesia's Old Order and its foreign policy excesses not to 
have some question about how high the new foreign policy profile might 
become if some of the political and structural problems of Indonesia 
remain unresolved through REPELITA IV and the expected 1988 presi- 
dential succession. 
13. B. N. Marbun in Kompas, July 19, 1984. 
